Institutions, Innovation and Economic Growth by Tebaldi, Edinaldo & Elmslie, Bruce
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Institutions, Innovation and Economic
Growth
Edinaldo Tebaldi and Bruce Elmslie
Bryant University, University of New Hampshire
13. May 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9683/
MPRA Paper No. 9683, posted 24. July 2008 10:39 UTC
INSTITUTIONS, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH* 
 
 
by 
 
Edinaldo Tebaldi 
Assistant Professor of Economics 
Department of Economics 
Bryant University 
1150 Douglas Pike, Suite J-142  
Smithfield, RI 02917 
Phone: 401-232-6901; Fax: 401-232-6068 
e-mail: etebaldi@bryant.edu 
 
and  
Bruce Elmslie 
Professor of Economics 
Department of Economics 
University of New Hampshire 
e-mail: bte@cisunix.unh.edu 
 
 
Abstract 
This article contributes to the growth literature by developing a formal growth model that provides the 
basis for studying institutions and technological innovation and examining how human capital and 
institutional constraints affect the transitional and steady state growth rates of output. The model 
developed in this article shows that the reason that growth models a-la-Romer (1990) generate 
endogenous growth is the use of a set of restrictive and unrealistic assumptions regarding the role of 
institutions in the economy. The baseline model developed in this article shows that the long-run growth 
of the economy is intrinsically linked to institutions and suggests that an economy with institutions that 
retard or prevent the utilization of newly invented inputs will experience low levels and low growth rates 
of output. The model also predicts that countries with institutional barriers that prevent or restrict the 
adoption of newly invented technologies will allocate a relative small share of human capital in the R&D 
sector. Moreover, both the baseline and the extended version of the model suggest that sustainable growth 
in human capital, not an increase in the stock of human capital, generates a growth effect.  
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I. Introduction 
Economists recognize that the quality of institutional arrangements play a key role in 
explaining long-run economic performance (North and Thomas, 1973; Engerman and Sokoloff, 
1997 and 2003; Hall and Jones, 1999; Rodrik, 2000 and 2003; Sala-i-Martin, 2002; Easterly and 
Levine, 2003; Gradstein, 2004; Glaeser et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2005). Despite 
the growing recognition of the importance of institutions,
1
 difficulties in introducing institutions 
into standard economic growth models have inhibited the development of a formal growth 
framework capable of explaining the dynamic linkages between institutions and long-run 
economic performance. Fundamentally, growth economists are still struggling to model the 
linkages between institutional quality and innovation and to incorporate institutions into the 
standard theoretical framework of economic growth (Sala-i-Martin, 2002, Huang and Xu, 1999). 
“We are still in the early stages when it comes to incorporating institutions into our growth 
theories” (Sala-i-Martin, 2002:18).  
Solovian models and endogenous growth models are built from the premise that income 
levels and income growth are determined by resource endowments (physical capital and human 
capital) and factor productivity [technology] (e.g., Solow, 1956; Romer, 1986 and 1990; Lucas, 
1998; Grossman and Helpman, 2001[1991]; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Jones, 1995; Young 
1998; Segerstrom 1998). Models in this tradition do not specify the role of institutions in the 
determination of income. Only a few studies have successfully incorporated institutions into the 
formal framework currently used to evaluate economic growth (e.g. Huang and Xu, 1999; and 
Gradstein, 2002 and 2004). While useful, these models focus the analysis on particular kinds of 
institutions and examine very specific issues. Thus, the dynamic association among institutions, 
                                                 
1
  There is a large and growing empirical literature on the impacts of institutions on economic performance (e.g. 
Gastil, 1979; Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Barro, 
1999; La Porta et al. 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001 and 2005; Easterly and Levine, 2003). 
 2 
innovation and income are not evaluated within a general framework that can answer basic 
questions such as: do institutions have growth or level effects on per capita income and does 
human capital interact with institutions? A model of growth that ignores the role of institutions 
may oversimplify the analysis and put out of sight important linkages in the dynamics of 
economic growth. Therefore, it seems that there is still a great deal of work with modeling the 
association between institutions and economic performance. 
This article contributes to the growth literature by developing a formal growth model that 
provides the basis for studying institutions and technological innovation. It examines how 
institutional constraints affect the transitional and steady state growth rates of output and models 
the interactions between institutions and human capital. In particular, it studies how the quality 
of institution affects the allocation of human capital to the R&D industry and the impacts of 
human capital on R&D and income growth in economies with poor institutions. The model also 
provides testable implications and the basis for specifying an empirical model for studying 
innovation and institutions. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the conceptual 
framework used to model the links between institutions, innovation and the adoption of new 
technologies in the productive process and then develops a baseline theoretical model. Section III 
discusses the baseline model’s implication. Section IV focuses on the links between human 
capital and institutions and presents an extension of the baseline model. Section V summarizes 
the article’s findings.  
II. Conceptual Framework 
A major difficulty to deal with institution in a formal framework in its conceptualization. For 
instance, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue that institutions should be “interpreted broadly to 
 3 
encompass not only formal political and legal structures but culture as well” (p. 261). North 
(1990) proposes examining institutions in terms of formal and informal rules and enforcement of 
procedures.
2
  The New Institutional Economic school considers institutions as the “application 
and extension of concepts such as transaction costs, property rights, public choice, and ideology” 
(Furobotn and Ricther, 2005:37). Overall, this conceptualization is very general and provides 
little aid in building a workable framework for the measurement and modeling of institutional 
arrangements. Sala-i-Martin (2002) suggests a pragmatic conceptualization of institutions in 
terms of a set of elements related to the ways that a society and its economy works in modern 
capitalism. He argues that institutions (or institutional arrangements) should account for the 
enforcement of contracts, protection of property rights, perceptions that the judiciary system is 
predictable and effective, transparency of the public administration, control of corruption, and 
pro-market regulations. 
In any event, from a theoretical standpoint, it would be intractable to incorporate every 
single nuance related to the concept of institutions. Therefore, in this article the quality of 
institutions (T) is treated as an aggregative index that measures attributes such as enforcement of 
contracts and property rights, perceptions that the judiciary system is predictable and effective, 
transparency of the public administration, control of corruption, and pro-market regulations.
 3
 
Moreover, this aggregative variable, T, is assumed to be continuous, increasing with the quality 
                                                 
2
 An institution is related to a “significant and persistent element (as a practice, a relationship, an organization) in the 
life of a culture that centers on a fundamental human need, activity, or value, occupies an enduring and cardinal 
position within a society and is usually maintained and stabilized through social regulatory agencies” (Merrian-
Webster, 1993:1171). 
 
3
 Empirical analyses on institutions have been conducted using objective and subjective measures of institutional 
quality. Objective measures quantify institutional aspects that are observable cross-country, such as the number of 
political assassinations, number of revolutions and coups and policy volatility. The subjective measures of 
institutions are mainly assembled by private companies (e.g. Transparency International) and based on an 
assessment of perception. These companies conduct perception surveys of “economic agents who make growth-
relevant decisions” (Moers, 1999:8) about factors such as corruption, contract enforcement, protection of property 
rights, political instability, etc. 
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of institutions, and grow at a constant rate, Tg . This specification relies heavily on the idea that 
institutions changes slowly and smoothly over time (Matthews, 1986; Atkinson, 1998).
4
 More 
precisely, once institutions are built, economic, social, and political mechanisms generated as a 
byproduct of those institutions are expected to set constraints on future institutional changes, so 
that those early institutional arrangements tend to persist over time (Engerman and Sokoloff, 
1997 and 2005; La Porta, et al., 1999; Acemoglu  et al., 2001).  
It is also important to acknowledge that institutional change (or growth of institutions) 
results from endogenous forces that are set in place by the quality and flexibility of the institution 
itself. For instance, institutional arrangements that allow for flexibility will allow the economic, 
political, and social forces to make changes to institutions so that private and/or public agents 
can “take advantage of new opportunities that arise as technology or the environment changes” 
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005:12).
5
 Therefore, the model developed in this article considers that 
institutional growth consists of changes in the legal system, regulations, enforcement of laws and 
culture aimed at improving the quality of the institutional structure of a country. Thus, 
institutional growth is expected to facilitate the decision-making process and increase the 
efficiency of resource allocation.  
2.1 The Baseline Model 
Figure 1 synthesizes the structure of the model we develop and shows a schematic 
representation of a hypothetical economy where human capital, technical innovation and 
intermediate inputs are the proximal-causal factors of income (levels and growth). Institutions 
                                                 
4
  It could be argued that institutional change takes place as a discrete process (or shocks) rather than as a continuous 
and smooth process. However, treating institutional changes as a discrete process would create additional modeling 
difficulties and we think that this issue should be addressed in further research.  
 
5
 “Perhaps the most important elements of institutional structures are those that ensure an ability to adapt to different 
conditions and to adjust to new circumstances as seems necessary” (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005:13). 
 5 
are considered the fundamental determinants of income because they have a direct effect on 
income generation through affects on factor productivity as well as an impact on human capital 
accumulation and on technical innovation, which are the direct and proximal-causal determinants 
of income.  
Figure 1 – A Schematic Model Economy 
 
For simplicity, the model is developed assuming that population and human capital are 
exogenously determined and constant. The baseline model overlooks the effects from human 
capital accumulation on institutions. This hypothesis is relaxed later in the extended model, 
which examines how the results of the baseline model change we allow for human capital to 
impact the quality of institutions. It is worth noticing that the model developed in this article is 
not intended to provide a comprehensive and complete analysis of institutions and economic 
performance, but rather it is aimed at providing the formal basis for studying how institutions 
and economic performance are inter-related. The model helps to examine the channels by which 
institutions affect technical innovation and consequently economic growth.  
The model economy has the structure used by Romer (1990). The economy has three 
sectors. One sector produces a final good using human capital, physical capital and a weighted 
aggregate measure of intermediate inputs. A second sector produces intermediate inputs using 
Institutions 
Intermediate 
Inputs (Capital) 
Innovation 
Human Capital 
Income 
(Level/Growth) 
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forgone consumption and the projects (knowledge) are developed in the third sector, which 
conducts research and development (R&D). The complete specification of each of these sectors 
is discussed below. 
i) Final Good Sector 
The representative firm that produces the final good utilizes a constant-returns-to-scale 
(CRS) technology and operates in a market characterized by perfect competition. Output is 
produced using the following production function: 
),(
0
)(
TAf
diixHY Y  (1) 
where YH is human capital employed in the final good sector, x(i) denotes intermediate inputs, 
A denotes knowledge,
6
 T measures the quality of institutions and is assumed to be increasing 
with the quality of the institutional structure, i indexes the variety of intermediate inputs, 
10 , 10 ,  and  +  = 1.
7
  
Equation 1 is a modified version of the production function found in Romer (1990). 
Romer’s model hypothesizes that all newly invented technologies can be instantaneously used in 
the production process. Instead, the specification here models potential institutional barriers to 
the adoption of new technologies into the production process. In a competitive market, firms are 
willing to use all intermediate inputs already invented and available if the cost of buying that 
input is less than or is equal to its marginal product. However, firms may have trouble in their 
decision to adopt newly productivity-increasing technologies due to institutional-related 
constraints, such as labor market imperfections (e.g. restrictive labor contracts or a union’s 
                                                 
6
 A is measured by the number of intermediate inputs already invented and available for use at any time with x(i)=0 
for all i > A. Moreover, A only increases if a newly invented intermediate input is superior in productivity compared 
to the existing intermediate inputs. 
 
7
 Notice that the argument time (t) is suppressed in all equations. 
 7 
bargaining power) and government regulations. These constraints may hold back the introduction 
of newly invented technologies in the production process (Baldwin and Lin, 2002, Haucap and 
Wey, 2004). We use a particular and perhaps restrictive f function
8
 to express these ideas 
mathematically. 
),min(
0
)(
AT
diixHY Y  (2) 
where 10  is a scale adjusting parameter that accounts for the influence of institutions on the 
adoption of new technologies and can be interpreted as a measure of the importance of 
institutional arrangements for the adoption of new technologies. 
Equation 2, therefore, assumes that either technological improvements (A) or Institutions 
(T), but not both, have marginal effects on output. The logic behind this formulation is that an 
economy may face institutional constraints to the adoption of new technologies in the productive 
process. In this case, only improvements in institutions (T) will allow the economy to incorporate 
newly invented inputs in the production process. This specification implies that “institutions 
need continual adaptation in face of a changing environment of technology” (Matthews, 
1986:908). Without changes in current institutions, the economy cannot fully exploit the 
efficiency gains from current innovation and so “institutional change is a necessary part of 
economic growth” (Matthews, 1986:908).9 We also assume that in the long run, the rate of 
innovation is at most equal to the rate in which institutions change, that is, an economy cannot 
innovate indefinitely without adapting its institutions to the new technologies (Atkinson, 1998; 
Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005). Under these assumptions, an economy may not be able to utilize 
                                                 
8
 Although restrictive, this specification generates a workable model and allows us to examine the impacts of 
institutions on the adoption of new technology. Other general functional specifications have caused difficulties in 
solving the model.  
 
9
 See also Engerman and Sokoloff  (2005). 
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available new technologies due to institutional barriers. Mathematically, we represent this case 
by setting TA , so the production function becomes: 
T
diixHY Y
0
)( . (3) 
This specification is consistent with case studies that examine how institutional-related 
constraints affect the adoption of new technologies.
10
  
ii) The intermediate sector  
A key feature of endogenous growth models is that they allow for imperfect competition 
in the intermediate sector, which makes the market structure relatively complex and constrains 
the researcher to model this sector in terms of a representative firm. In this study, it is assumed 
that there is a distinct producer for each input i, who must buy the patent (design) of that input 
from an R&D producer.
11
 The model considers that there is only one producer of input i, which 
implies that there is only one seller of input i who will face a downward sloping demand curve. 
However, because institutions may bind the adoption of new technologies, newly invented inputs 
might not be used for a while, so their marginal product and price would be driven to zero over 
the period of time for which institutions bind the adoption of the newly invented inputs. 
                                                 
10
 For instance, one can make the case that government regulations prevent the use, production and 
commercialization of genetically modified crops; a productivity-increasing technology. There is a noticeable 
concentration of the production of transgenic crops in a few countries (James, 2004)
 
while transgenic seeds have 
been widely available for commercialization since 1996 (James and Krattigger, 1996). Institutional arrangements 
explain much of this. First, innovating countries may be afraid of delivering new technologies to countries with a 
poor system of property rights protection (Krattiger, 1997). In this case, institutionally backward countries are not 
able to learn and adapt the new technologies because they have no access to the technology needed to manipulate the 
genetically altered seeds. This may lessen the benefits of using transgenic seeds in institutionally backward 
countries. However, these countries would still be able to buy transgenic seeds from the leading innovating 
countries. Second, biosafety regulatory laws impose strong constraints on the implementation of the production and 
commercialization of genetically altered seeds in many countries around the world (Krattiger, 1997, James, 2004).  
 
11
 Models in the Romer (1990) tradition assume that the intermediate inputs can be produced using the same 
technology utilized to produce the final good, where consumption is forgone (in the form of capital) in order to 
produce the intermediate inputs. For simplicity, it is assumed here that each unit of consumption forgone can 
generate one unit of capital that can be used in the production of intermediate inputs. 
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Therefore, at a point in time, the inverse demand function for input i --which can be derived from 
the profit optimality conditions of the producer of the final good-- is given by: 
ATif
ATifxH
p
i
i
Y
0
1
 (4) 
Because we assume that institutions are continuously changing at a positive rate, 
eventually all newly invented inputs can be used to produce final goods. This, however, affects 
the intertemporal profitability of the producer of intermediate goods. We consider this issue 
below when modeling the value of innovation. For now, assume that the producer of 
intermediate inputs faces an opportunity cost of capital equal to the interest rate (r) and that the 
cost of buying a patent is fixed, so it can be omitted from the profit function:  
)()()()( irxixipi  (5) 
Substituting equation 4 into equation 5 and taking the first-order conditions generates: 
1
1
2
)(
r
H
ix
Y
 (6) 
Manipulating equations 5 and 6 gives:  
)(
1
)( irxi  (7) 
Substituting equation 6 into equation 4 generates
r
pip )( , that is; the price of the 
intermediate inputs are identical for all i. This result implies that the producer of the final good 
will demand an identical amount of each intermediate input i, that is, x(i)=x. 
A potential new producer of an intermediate input decides to enter the market by 
comparing the discounted stream of profit generated by producing that input and the price that 
must be paid for the patent. If the price of a patent (new design) is determined in a perfectly 
 10 
competitive market then its price (PA) will be equal to the present discounted stream of profit that 
the producer of intermediate inputs could make producing the intermediate input i. However, 
institutions bind the adoption of newly invented inputs until the time , when T is large enough. 
Assuming that the value of  is identical for each innovation, then the market value of innovation 
is given by:  
dteP rtA  (8) 
Equation 8 can be solved and its solution written as 
rre
P
rA
, where 1re . 
This shows that the discounted value of innovation depends on the time framework for which 
institutions bind the adoption of newly invented technologies. More precisely, the smaller is , 
the greater the value of new discoveries.
12
 The case in which institutions do not bind the 
adoption of new technologies is easily obtained by setting =0.   
iii)  The R&D Sector  
The new growth theory a-la-Romer assumes that innovation results from ordinary 
economic activities aimed at generating profit. New growth theory also suggests that innovation 
depends primarily on personnel engaged in R&D and the existing knowledge (Romer, 1990; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 2001 [1991]; and Jones, 1995). Models 
developed in this tradition ignore the role of institutions in the innovation process. Despite the 
fact that institutions are not explicitly present in growth models, economists in this field readily 
accept the idea that institutions greatly impact innovation. For instance, Sala-i-Martin (2002) 
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 For simplicity,  is treated as a constant. In a more general framework, however,  should be modeled as a 
function of both the quality of institutions and the state-of-technology, that is, ),( TAg . A workable functional 
form could take the form: 0,1
T
A
Max .  
 11 
affirms that “it is hard to come up with new and better technologies if an economy does not have 
the right institutions” (p. 18). 
Freeman (1987) shows that the quality of institutions is a key component in the process 
of creating and diffusing new technologies. Specifically, when firms are left on their own, they 
engage in myopic innovative processes that will lead to profit maximization in the short-run, but 
would not maximize long-run profits. In other words, one could argue that some institutions 
create incentives for firms to focus only on the short-run. Therefore, suitable macro-institutions 
may provide proper incentives for innovation by changing firms’ myopic behavior in the short-
run, leading firms to engage in innovative processes that would ensure long-term profitability.  
Lundvall (1992) states that innovation is not a deterministic process and “together the 
economic structure and the institutional set-up form the framework for and strongly affect, 
processes of interactive learning, sometimes resulting in innovations” (Lundvall, 1992:12). In 
agreement with this argument, Matthews (1986) points out that better institutional arrangements 
enable economic agents “to cooperate with one another more efficiently” (p.908) thus 
stimulating innovation. Furthermore, a complete model of innovation needs to recognize that 
“institutions need continual adaptation in face of a changing environment of technology” 
(Matthews, 1986:908), that is, improvements in technology make existing institutions relatively 
obsolete. 
These ideas are incorporated into the standard growth framework of innovation by 
explicitly modeling institutions as part of the innovation process. More precisely, we assume that 
the quality of institutions directly affects the innovation process by including a variable that 
accounts for the quality of institutions (T) directly into the production function of new ideas, but 
 12 
not as a choice variable. Therefore, R&D firms determine their demand for human capital taking 
institutions for granted. Consider the equation:  
))(( ATqAHA A  
(9) 
where A measures technical knowledge, HA is human capital engaged in R&D, q denotes the 
quality of institutions controlling for the state-of-art technology, and  is a productivity 
parameter. It is assumed that q increases with improvements in institutions (T), that is, 0
T
q
. 
The logic behind this formulation is that institutions affect the production of new R&D projects. 
Good institutions contribute to facilitate the process of registering new patents, to disseminate 
ideas and promote cooperation across researchers, to speed up diffusion of scientific knowledge, 
to improve enforcement of property rights and to reduce the uncertainty of new projects; all 
factors that stimulate R&D activities. Furthermore, we also need to consider the impacts of 
technology on the quality of institutions and, in particular, account for the needed adaptation of 
institutions in face of changes of technology (Matthews, 1986; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005). 
Institutional obsolescence due to technological change can be accounted for by assuming that
0
A
q
. We propose a tractable
13
 specification of the q function by defining 
a
ATq / , 
where 10 a . Accordingly, the production function of new technologies is:  
aa THAA A )(
1
 (10) 
It is worth noticing that this model of innovation departs greatly from Romer (1990). 
More precisely, Romer’s R&D production function represents a special case where 0a . Under 
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 Although restrictive, this specification accounts for the major issues discussed in the section above and allows 
solving the model. Other general functional forms were attempted, but posed serious difficulties in solving the 
model.  
 13 
the assumptions that 0a  and institutions do not bind the adoption of new technologies, the 
model implies that doubling the number of workers devoted to R&D will double the growth rate 
of knowledge. In the steady state, the growth rate of output per capita is equal to the growth rate 
of knowledge and the scale effect from the R&D sector extends to output per capita, i.e., 
doubling the number of workers devoted to R&D doubles the growth rate of per capita output. 
Jones (1995) shows that such an implication is not consistent with the empirical record and can 
be easily falsified, and suggests an alternative specification in which the discovery of new ideas 
becomes more difficult as the stock of knowledge increases.  
The model developed here does not generate scale effects (see discussion in the next 
section), so Jones’ critique is not an issue. Moreover, the model also expands on Jones’s 
specification because it provides a rationale for how the discovery of new ideas becomes more 
difficult when the stock of knowledge increases. Additionally, it accounts for the direct effect of 
institutions on technical innovation. This development allows one to evaluate the channels 
through which institutions affect technical innovation.  
vi) Equilibrium in the Labor Market  
The model assumes a competitive labor market with human capital perfectly mobile 
across the final good sector and the R&D sector. In equilibrium, wages are equalized across 
sectors so AY WW , where WY and WA are the wages in the final good sector and R&D sector, 
respectively. Using the results from the previous section (in particular the fact that x(i)=x) and 
equation 3) we derive the marginal product of human capital in the final-good sector: 
TxHW YY
1 . (11) 
 14 
The wage in the R&D sector is obtained by considering that the R&D producer is willing 
to hire more workers as long as the wage rate is less than or equal to its marginal product. The 
optimizing conditions give:
14
  
aa
A TA
r
W )(1  (12) 
Defining  and using the equilibrium condition WA=WY, equation 6, equation 7, 
and the identity YA HHH  generates: 
rZHH aA
1  (13) 
Equation 13 represents the inverse demand function for human capital in the R&D sector 
and summarizes both the labor market equilibrium and the supply side of the economy. The 
following section examines the demand side, so we can close the model and determine the 
general equilibrium conditions. 
v)  Closing the Model  
The demand side is modeled in terms of a representative agent. For simplicity, the 
population is normalized to 1 and the utility function is assumed to have a logarithmic form
15
. 
The solution of the consumer problem is well-known in the growth literature and produces the 
Euler equation, rCC , where C is consumption, r is the interest rate and  is the 
intertemporal discount rate. To save space, the derivations are not shown here. The model 
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 Consider the profit function: AA
aa
AAAAA HWTHAPHWAPMax A )(
1 . From first-order conditions, 
we obtain 
aa
AA TAPW )(
1
. Substituting equation 8 into this equation produces the result above. 
 
15
 )ln()( CCU .  
 15 
generates a well-behaved steady state solution where output and consumption grow at the same 
rate 
C
C
Y
Y
. Log-differentiating equation 3 and using the Euler equation give: 
rg
C
C
Y
Y
T  
(14) 
where 
T
T
gT .  Equation 14 represents the equilibrium condition for the demand side.  
General equilibrium requires that both the demand and the supply side equilibrium-
equations hold together and that the steady state growth rates of technology and output be 
constant. From equation 10 we obtain:  
a
AA ZH
A
A
g  (15) 
In the steady state 0
dt
dgA , so equation 15 implies that TA gg . Combining this result 
with equation 14 produces AT ggg . Because the growth rate of institutions is exogenous, 
this result implies that long-run economic growth is determined exogenously by the rate of 
change in institutions. The detailed implications of the model are discussed in the next section. 
III. Discussion and Implications  
Even though the model predicts that long-run growth is determined exogenously by the 
rate of change in institutions, the model allows examining how institutions affect the economic 
dynamics of relevant variables and how institutions influence the production and adoption of 
technologies. We can solve the model for the steady state values of relevant endogenous 
variables such as YA HandHZ ,, and then study how these variables are affected when we relax the 
assumptions regarding the role of institutions on production and adoption of technologies. We 
 16 
begin by finding the values of Z and HA around the steady state and then examine how these 
variables and the growth rate of output respond to changes in the assumptions regarding the 
impacts of institutions on the production and adoption of technologies.  
The Baseline model implies that in the steady state g is a constant and can be treated as a 
parameter. Therefore, equations 13, 14, and 15 can be rearranged to form: 
 
0
01)( 1
a
A
aA
Z
g
H
Zg
HH
H
 (16) 
Equation 16 represents a non-linear system with no analytical solution. We simplify this 
problem by using a first-order Taylor approximation around the steady state. Let *AAA HHH  
and *ZZZ , where 
*
AH  and 
*Z  denotes the steady state values of AH  and Z, respectively. 
In matrix form, a first-order linear approximation of equation 16 can be written as follows: 
0
0
1
)(
)1(1
1*
*
Z
H
Z
ag
Zg
H
a
H A
a
a
 (17) 
A nontrivial solution for this system around the steady state will exist only if the 
coefficient matrix is singular, that is, the determinant of the coefficient matrix must be zero. 
Imposing this condition produces:  
0))(1( *1* aa Zga
H
Z
H
ag
 (18) 
Equation 18 can be solved for the steady state value of Z: 
)()1(
*
g
g
a
a
Z  (19) 
 17 
can be interpreted as the steady state quality of institutions adjusted for the state-of-art 
technology. In other words, the model suggests that there is an optimal mix of technology 
development (A) and institutional structure (T). Therefore, an economy will not be able to 
promote technological development without having an institutional structure appropriate for its 
level of technological development 
Proposition 1: There is an optimal mix of technology and institutional quality, so that 
technological change will only take place in an economy that has an institutional 
structure suitable to its level of technological development.  
 
In line with the result above, institutions also affect the allocation of human capital in the 
R&D sector. Considering that perfect labor mobility guarantees that the labor market is in 
equilibrium at all points in time, we can combine equations 13, 14, and 19 and obtain a solution 
for the steady state value of AH : 
aa
aa
A gg
a
a
HH 1
1
*
1
1
 (20) 
Equation 20 implies that poor institutions negatively influence the allocation of human 
capital in the R&D industry. This can be easily seen by considering the case in which institutions 
deteriorate causing the time required to adopt new technologies ( ) to increase once-for-all. 
Consequently, the value of the parameter  increases. Using equation 20 we find that the partial 
derivative 
*
AH  is negative,
16
 which implies that the steady state employment (and share) of 
human capital in the R&D sector decreases. Therefore, controlling for all other determinants of 
innovation, a country with poor institutional arrangements and restrictions to adopt new 
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 0
1
1
1*
aa
aa
A gg
a
aaH
 
 18 
technologies is expected to have a relatively small share of human capital employed in the R&D 
sector. This result is summarized in Proposition 2.   
Proposition 2: Poor institutions or institutional barriers that prevent or restrict the 
adoption of newly invented technologies decrease the share of human capital employed in 
the R&D sector, which hinders innovation. 
It can also be demonstrated that an increase in  decreases the short-run (transitional) 
growth rate of output. It is worth noticing that it only makes sense to consider the impact (short-
run) of a change in  on g (output growth) around the neighborhood of the steady state solution 
for Z. The impact of changes in  on transitional (or short-run) growth rate of output can be 
analyzed by utilizing equations 13, 14, 15, and 20. Combining these equations generates: 
1*
1*
*
**
1 Z
HZ
Z
ZHZ
g
aa
 (21) 
It can be shown that 0
g 17
, which suggests that the short-run growth rate of output 
decreases when changes in institutions add more restrictions to the adoption of newly invented 
technologies. This implies that institutional arrangements that constrain the adoption of newly 
invented technologies hamper short-run output growth.  
Proposition 3: Institutional barriers to adopt newly invented technologies decrease the 
short-run growth rate of output.  
 
The model also precludes income convergence as predicted by Solovian-type models. For 
instance, consider two small
18
 countries, S1 and S2 that face a world with perfect and 
instantaneous diffusion of knowledge, such that A is identical for both countries. In other words, 
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a
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1
1
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18
 A country is small in the sense that its knowledge production does not affect the world knowledge frontier.  
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these countries may potentially utilize all of the available technology in the world. Moreover, 
assume that the stock of human capital is identical in both countries and that country S1 has 
relatively poor institutions that bind the adoption of new technologies )( AT  while country S2 
faces no institutional barriers to adopt new technologies )( AT . Under these conditions and 
using equation 2 and the results from Section II, we obtain the ratio . Because Z is 
less than one and constant in the steady state (see equation 19), the income gap will not disappear 
and income in the country with relative poor institutions (S1) will never catch up to the levels of 
income in the country with relative better institutions. This result is summarized as follows: 
Proposition 4: Controlling for diffusion of technology and human capital, a country with 
a lower level of income and relative poor institutional arrangements will not converge to 
the levels of income existing in countries with better institutions. 
 
It is also worth noticing that relaxing the assumption that institutions prevent the use of 
newly invented technologies is neither sufficient to generate endogenous growth nor affect the 
steady state growth rate of output. The model can easily allow for instantaneous use of new 
technologies by setting  and 1Z (or )AT . Using equation 2 and the results from 
Section v still generates
A
A
Y
Y
. From equation 10 we find that 
T
T
A
A
. Therefore, long-run 
economic growth is still determined by the rate of change in institutions, which is exogenous. 
Endogenous growth is only obtained by assuming that institutions neither bind the adoption of 
new technologies nor affect the production of new ideas. The model easily allows examining this 
scenario by considering that  and . Imposing these conditions produces:
19
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 We can easily get these results by either solving the model again or by calculating the limit of equation 21. 
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0
1
0
1,
lim
H
a
Z
g
g  (22) 
To sum up, the model suggests that the reason that growth models a-la-Romer (1990) 
generate endogenous growth is the use of a set of restrictive and unrealistic assumptions 
regarding the role of institutions in the economy. Endogenous growth is precluded in a more 
general framework that allows institutions to play a role in the production and adoption of new 
technologies. The model developed in this paper actually shows that institutions affect 
technological innovation, long-run economic growth, and the allocation of human capital in the 
R&D sector. The next section further discusses the implications of the model and considers the 
impacts of human capital accumulation on institutions and economic growth.   
IV. Institutions and Human Capital 
The results discussed in section III imply that an increase in the stock of human capital 
neither influences the steady state growth rate of technical progress nor affects the steady growth 
rate of output. More specifically, changes in H will affect the short-run growth rate of innovation 
and output, but will not affect the rates of technological change and output growth in the long-
run. This result contradicts Romer (1990) and Jones (1995). Moreover, according to equation 19, 
changes in H will not affect the optimal combination of technology development (A) and 
institutional structure (T). Therefore, the Baseline Model greatly diminishes the role of human 
capital in explaining long-term economic performance. In fact, the predominant role of human 
capital that is emphasized in the New Growth literature is replaced with the quality of 
institutions. However, this strong conclusion is a byproduct of the model economy that assumes 
that institutions and human capital are unrelated. In this section, we take a first step toward 
relaxing this working-assumption. In particular, given the fact that the growth literature 
 21 
emphasizes the importance of human capital accumulation for economic growth (e.g. Lucas, 
1988; Romer, 1990; Glaeser et al. 2004), we modify the model to allow for interactions between 
human capital and institutions. Specifically, we incorporate the idea that current institutions 
depend on human capital accumulation.
20
 Consider the following equation: 
 dsesHtT s
t
)()(  (23) 
where  > 0 accounts for all determinants of institutions
21
 other than human capital (H) and  
weights the impact of human capital on current institutions.  
The form of this equation has a long history in economic thought. Rosenberg (1963) 
explains Bernard Mandeville’s (early 1700’s) ideas on the development of good institutions as an 
evolutionary process dependent on generations of accumulated knowledge. “Human institutions 
are not to be regarded as the product of human ingenuity, much less the result of a single mind. 
They are, rather, the fruits of a long gradual growth process. The results of this evolution are not 
only contrivances beyond the ingenuity of individuals; once they have evolved, they multiply 
manyfold the otherwise crude and limited abilities of the individual human agent… [Institutions] 
are the product, not of inspiration (either human or divine) but of the collective experience of the 
human race” (Rosenberg, 1963:186-87) or  dsesHtT s
t
)()( .  
Equation 23 implies that the current institutional arrangement is a function of current and 
past human capital stocks and of colonial legacy and geography ( ). The motivation for 
including  in the model has been debated extensively by economists. For instance, Acemoglu et 
al. (2001 and 2005) argue that early institutions were affected by geography because the 
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 A more general framework should also model the impacts of institutions on human capital accumulation.  
 
21
 To conform to the literature (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2005),  can be specified as a 
function of geographically related variables and the colonial legacy (e.g. origin of the legal system, colonization 
type, etc).   
 22 
colonization process endogenously responded to certain environmental conditions, creating 
institutions specific to the colony’s geography. Specifically, colonies characterized by a heavy 
burden of infectious disease (e.g. malaria and yellow fever) discouraged the formation of 
European-type settlements. In these non-settler colonies“… colonial powers set up ´extractive 
states´…. These institutions did not introduce much protection for private property, nor did they 
provide checks and balances against government expropriation” (Acemoglu et al., 2001:1370). 
On the other hand, geographically advantaged settlement colonies were relatively free to engage 
in processes that replicated in some way European social arrangements, which ultimately helped 
to develop better institutions and generate a system that protected private property rights in these 
colonies (Denoon, 1983; Acemoglu et al., 2001). Engerman and Sokoloff (2005), Gallup et al. 
(1999), and Sachs (2000) also support the view that geography affects the development of 
growth-promoting institutions. In addition, Tebaldi and Elmslie (2008) show that stock of human 
capital is an important factor in explaining early institutions.  
The ideas above are treated in a simplistic way by assuming that the stock of human 
capital is constant over time, that is, HtH )( . Therefore, equation 23 becomes: 
tHetT )(  (24) 
Notice that equation 24 implies .  Thus it suggests that a country that started 
with a larger stock of human capital and were located in geographically-advantaged areas would 
be able to develop better early institutional arrangements, which ultimately reflects in the quality 
of current institutions because of the persistence effect. The persistence effect is the idea that 
once institutions are built, economic and political mechanisms generated as a byproduct of those 
institutions will set constraints on future institutional changes and those early institutional 
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arrangements will persist over time (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; La Porta, et al., 1999; 
Acemoglu  et al., 2001). Equation 24 also implies that the initial conditions will not affect the 
rate in which institutions change over time, thus initial conditions have level but not growth 
effects on the quality of institutions. Log-differentiating equation 24 produces: 
T
T
gT  (25) 
Equation 25 implies that the growth rate of institutions depends on the weight (or 
persistence effect) that historical (or geographical) determinants ( ) and previously accumulated 
human capital have in determining current institutions. Specifically, a larger  implies that the 
historical legacy (or initial human capital) is very persistent over time and once a society 
develops these early institutions, it is very hard to change them, so current institutions is very 
much the result of early institutional arrangements. For instance, a large  implies that a 
country's initial stock of human capital would have a significant role in shaping earlier 
institutions, which, through the persistence effect, would positively influence current institutions. 
Therefore, this model makes the case that the growth rate of current institutions depends on the 
weight (persistence effect) that historical determinants and accumulated human capital have on 
current institutions. 
Even though this formulation is basic and ignores the feedback effect from institutional 
change on human capital accumulation, it allows for the evaluation of changes in human capital 
accumulation patterns on institutions, innovation and economic growth.
22
  
We use the framework above to investigate the impacts of a once-for-all increase in H, at 
time tk, on the time paths of T, Z, and Y. Equation 24 and Figure 2 show that the quality of 
institutions responds to the rise in the stock of human capital. The level of ln(T) jumps up at tk, 
                                                 
22
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the moment in which the stock of human capital increases, and then settles into a higher path 
parallel to the first trajectory. Therefore, an increase in the stock of human capital is expected to 
improve the quality of institutions (level effect), but does not affect the rate in which institutions 
change. 
Figure 2: Current Institutions and Initial Conditions 
 
Using this result and the fact that A is constant at a point in time, an increase in T will 
cause Z to jump up from Z
*
 to Z
1
, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 3. Equations 10 and 15 
imply that improved institutions and the availability of more human capital will increase the 
short-run rate of innovation, causing A to increase over time (see upper panel in Figure 3). The 
latter effect causes Z to decrease and move towards its steady state value. Therefore, the 
economy returns to its long-run growth path, where A and T grow at the same rate (g) and Z is 
constant. The long-run rate of output growth is unaffected because output, innovation, and 
institutions grow at the same rate in the steady state. 
t 
ln(T) 
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tk 
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Proposition 5: An once-for-all increase in the stock of human capital will not affect the 
long-run growth rate of the economy. Only sustainable growth in human capital 
generates steady state growth effects. 
 
Figure 3: Impacts of an Increase in H on the Time Paths of A and Z 
 
However, because an increase in the stock of human capital affects the levels (quality) of 
institutions, it will also affect innovation and the growth rate of output in the short-run as well as 
the steady state levels of output. In particular, improvements in the quality of institutions will 
boost the adoption of new intermediate inputs (technologies) and increase output levels. More 
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precisely, calculating the partial derivative of equation 21 with respect to H, in the neighborhood 
of the steady, produces 0
1*
1*
* Z
Z
H
g
ZZ .
 
However, this effect is only temporary and output growth returns to its long-run path that 
is determined by the growth rate of institutions (see Figure 4). The rationale behind these results 
is as follows: an increase in human capital causes a jump in the quality of institutions and 
enhances innovation increasing the production of new technologies and the growth rate of 
output. However, this short-run effect will cease over time because new technologies will also 
change the production modes and increase the complexity of the social and economic 
relationships, making the existing institutional structure relatively obsolete. In turn, this slows 
down the innovation rate (gA) and, consequently, slows down the growth rate of output, which 
eventually returns to its long-run path. This result can be summarized as follows:  
Proposition 6: a one-time increase in the stock of human capital enhances the quality of 
institutions and positively affects the level and the short-run growth rate of output. 
 
Figure 4: Impact on Levels of Output 
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Do the results above change if the assumption that institutions bind the adoption of new 
technologies is relaxed? To examine this case we assume that TA and =1. We solve the 
model again considering these assumptions, but to save space, only the key equilibrium 
conditions are reported below. More precisely, equations 19 and 20 are now given by: 
a
H
g
Z
1
* )1(
 (19A) 
)1(
1*
g
g
HH A  (20A) 
Under the assumptions stated above, it can be shown that long-run output growth is still 
determined by the rate of change in institutions. Therefore, a once-for-all change in the stock of 
human capital will not influence long-run output growth. However, the short-run dynamics of 
output and innovation and the optimal mix of technology development and institutions are 
affected. According to equation 19A, a once-for-all increase in the stock of human capital will 
reduce the optimal mix of technology development and institutions (Z), that is, . This 
actually implies that human capital works, in some degree, as a substitute for institutions in the 
R&D industry, and so economies with a large stock of human capital will have a smaller 
requirement of institutions to technology (Z*). This in turn means that human capital allows an 
economy to expand its knowledge frontier (A) relative to the quality of its institutions.  
Proposition 7: Under the assumption that institutions do not bind the adoption of new 
technologies, a one-time increase in the stock of human capital allows an economy to 
expand its knowledge frontier (A) relatively to the quality of its institutions. 
 
Moreover, equation 20A implies that . This result shows that a change in the 
stock of human capital will not affect the size of the optimal share of human capital allocated in 
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the R&D industry. Other general results found in section III still holds. In particular, it is worth 
noticing that ( as discussed in section III) an increase in H will cause a discontinuous jump in the 
levels of institutions in the short-run growth rate of the economy, g. However, the impact-change 
productivity gains in terms of innovation and adoption of technologies, which are then followed 
by a short-run expansion in output cannot be sustained in the long-term due to the incapacity of 
the society to change its institutional structure  quick enough to the satisfy the new social, 
economic, and political organizational demands created by the new technologies. This 
decelerates the growth rate of innovation as well as the growth rate of output, bringing the 
economy back towards its steady state path, which is determined by institutional changes. 
V. Conclusion 
The model developed in this article shows that growth models a-la-Romer (1990) 
generate endogenous growth by using a set of restrictive and unrealistic assumptions regarding 
the role of institutions in the economy. Endogenous growth is precluded in a more general 
framework that allows institutions to play a role in the production and adoption of new 
technologies. This article shows that the long-run growth of the economy is intrinsically linked 
to the growth rate of institutions and suggests that an economy with institutions that retard or 
prevent the utilization of newly invented inputs will experience low rates of technological 
change and output growth. In either case, whether institutions bind or whether institutions do not 
bind the adoption of technologies, the long-run growth of output is driven by the growth rate of 
innovation, which is ultimately determined by the growth rate of institutions. However, the short-
run growth rate of the economy and the level of output are lowered if institutional arrangements 
constrain the adoption of new technologies. In the short-run, an economy whose institutional 
arrangements are not changing at the rate needed to follow the path of technological change will 
 29 
experience a slowdown in its rate of innovation and consequently a slowdown in its growth rate 
of output. Therefore, institutional barriers to adopt newly invented technologies decrease the 
short-run growth rate of output. 
The model also predicts that countries with institutional barriers that prevent or restrict 
the adoption of newly invented technologies will allocate a relatively small share of human 
capital to the R&D sector, which hinders innovation. 
The model also supports the view that human capital is an important determinant of both 
institutions and output. In fact, it suggests that a one-time increase in the stock of human capital 
enhances the quality of institutions, allows an economy to expand its knowledge frontier 
relatively to the quality of its institutions, and positively affects the short-run growth rate of 
innovation and output and the level of output. However, it also implies that human capital has no 
growth effect, that is, an increase in the stock of human capital will not affect the long-run 
growth rate of the economy. Only sustainable growth in human capital generates growth effects 
in output. Therefore, differences in the stock of human capital are expected to explain income 
level differentials across countries, but not growth differentials across countries. This is broadly 
consistent with the predictions of the Uzawa (1965), Lucas (1988) and Jones (1995) theoretical 
models, which suggest that the growth rate of output is proportional to the growth rate of human 
capital. However, it contradicts the predictions of the Romer (1990) and Rebelo (1991) models, 
which suggest that the level of human capital is associated with the growth rate of the economy. 
To sum up, the model presented in this article lessens the role of human capital in explaining 
long-term economic performance while emphasizes the significance of institutions as the engine 
of long-term technological innovation and economic performance. 
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